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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, and GARY
BENDER and BONNIE M. BENDER,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellant,

Case No. 370551-CA

v.
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri
corporation, et al.

Argument P r i o r i t y No. 14h

Defendants and
Respondents.
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri
corporation,
Counterclaimant,
v.
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, et al.,
Counterclaim
Defendants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
From a final order of the Fifth District Court in and
for Iron County, Utah, in favor of defendants, Bohemian Savings &
Loan Association, Olympic Federal and American Federal Savings
and Loan Association, Midwest Home Savings and Loan Association,
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association and First Security Realty
Services Corporation, plaintiff, Gary Bender, appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court.

On December 3, 198 7, pursuant to UTAH CODE

ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended), the Supreme Court
transferred the appeal to this Court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

not finding that plaintiff was .substantially justified in failing
to attend his deposition.
2.

Whether the sanctions imposed were extreme under

the circumstances so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
3.

Whether the evidence presented at the sanctions

hearing justified the amount of attorney's fees and costs
awarded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a case involving, among other things, breach of
contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misrepresentation
-2-

on the part of the defendants with respect to a construction loan
for a condominium project owned and developed by plaintiff,
Pacific Development Corporation, known as the "Brian Ridge" which
is located in Brianhead, Utah.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
On March 20, 198 6, the plaintiffs commenced this action
against the various defendants in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County.

Pursuant to defendant Bohemian's motion to change

venue, this action was transferred to the Fifth Judicial District
Court of Iron County by order entered June 9, 1986.
During the course of proceedings, the defendants filed
a Motion for Sanctions against plaintiff, Gary Bender, for his
non-appearance at his deposition which had been scheduled for May
28, 1987.

The Motion for Sanctions, together with a scheduling

conference, was heard on July 28, 198 7, at Parowan, Utah, before
the Honorable Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.

After receiving

evidence and hearing arguments of the various counsel present at
the hearing, Judgment Baldwin sanctioned plaintiff by requiring
him to pay costs and attorney's fees, in the total sum of
$10,300.00, to the defendants as follows:

(a) to Bohemian

Savings & Loan Association, the sum of $7,500.00; (b) to Olympic
and American Federal Savings and Loan Association, the sum of
$1,000.00; (c) to Midwest Home Savings and Loan Association and
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, the sum of $1,000.00; and
-3-

(d.) to First Security Realty Services Corporation, the sum of
$800.00.

(R-181-192) Final judgments in favor of these

defendants were entered on September 18, 1987.

(R-193-214)

Statement of Facts
During the course of proceedings plaintiff, Gary
Bender, at defendants1 requests, on three separate occasions
traveled from his home in Huntington Beach, California to Salt
Lake City to be deposed by defendants for a total of eight days.
The first deposition took place on December 15, 16, and 17, 198 6,
in Salt Lake City at which time plaintiff was interrogated for
approximately 2 2 hours.
Soon thereafter, plaintiff began experiencing
continuous pain and illness, which was later diagnosed as acute
prostatitis or chronic infection of the prostate.

(T-54)

(A

copy of plaintiff's medical records is attached hereto as
Appendix "A H J

Plaintiff again traveled from California to Salt

Lake City and attended his deposition on March 10, 198 7.
However, due to the extreme pain and discomfort he was
experiencing, this deposition was terminated and rescheduled for
March 31, 1987.
Due to the state of his health, plaintiff made an
attempt to continue the March 31, 1987 deposition by filing a
Motion for Continuance and/or Protective Order.
motion is attached hereto as Appendix "B".)
-4-

(A copy of this

As grounds for the

motion, plaintiff stated that he was currently under a doctor's
care for what was perceived by his doctors to be a potentially
serious medical problem.

Plaintiff indicated that he had been

advised by his physician that because of the need to monitor his
condition and the need for further tests in order to accurately
assess the nature and extent of his medical condition, he should
not travel for any length of time and should not leave the care
of his physician for more than one or two days at a time.
Plaintiff also submitted a letter from his doctor, Stan M. Walsh,
M.D. stating that he should not be traveling in automobiles or
airplanes until resolution of the medical problems.

(A copy of

the physicians statement dated March 13, 198 7 is attached to the
motion in Appendix "B".)
The trial court denied plaintiff's Motion for
Continuance and/or Protective Order and ordered the deposition of
plaintiff to proceed as scheduled on March 31, 1987.
Plaintiff made his third trip from California to Salt
Lake City to be deposed by defendants on March 31, 1987 as was
ordered by the court.

He was again interrogated at great length

by counsel for four days from 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, March 31,
1987 through 3:55 P.M. on Friday, April 3, 1987.

At that time,

plaintiff explained to counsel at the deposition that he had a
previously scheduled return flight to California for the weekend
so that he could seek medical attention the following Monday,
-5-

April 6, 1987.

Plaintiff therefore requested that the deposition

resume on Tuesday, April 7, 198 7.

Defendants granted that

request.
The following Monday, April 6, 1987, plaintiff was
hospitalized at 9:45 P.M. and underwent treatment for the next
four days for acute prostatitis.

Plaintiff was discharged from

the hospital on April 10, 1987.

(A copy of plaintiff's hospital

in-patient registration form, is included in Appendix "A"
attached hereto.)
Prior to the April 7, 1987 deposition, plaintiff's
counsel notified defendant Bohemian's counsel that plaintiff
was hospitalized and therefore would not be able to appear for
the deposition.

After being informed that plaintiff was

hospitalized, defendant Bohemian's counsel nevertheless chose to
appear at the April 7, 1987 deposition and later brought a Motion
for Sanctions against plaintiff for his non-appearance.

(A copy

of defendant Bohemian's Motion for Sanctions outlining the above
facts is attached hereto as Appendix "C".)

The trial court took

this motion under advisement and ordered plaintiff to file his
hospital records with the court by April 20, 1987.

(A copy of

the Order is attached hereto as Appendix "D".)
Pursuant to the Order, plaintiff's counsel submitted
his medical records to the court on April 18, 1987.
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Included was

plaintiff's hospital records as well as a letter from John M.
Dick, M.D.

(These are included in Appendix "A".)

On April 20, 1987, plaintiff, Gary Bender, on behalf of
plaintiff Pacific Development Corporation filed a voluntary
petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy with the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.

The Bankruptcy Court

scheduled the first meeting of creditors for May 28, 198 7, at
10:00 A.M.

Being aware that plaintiff would be in Salt Lake City

on that date for the meeting of creditors, defendant Bohemian
formerly noticed plaintiff's deposition for 2:00 P.M. on the same
day.

(T-38-40)

At about 1:30 P.M. that day plaintiff advised

defendant Bohemian's counsel that he did not intend to appear at
the deposition.

(T-39)

Plaintiff did not appear at the

deposition and as a result, the various defendants filed Renewed
Motions for Sanctions.
At the hearing on defendants' motions, held on July 28,
1987, plaintiff indicated that his decision to not attend the
deposition was based upon the state of his health at that time,
which precluded submitting to what he thought would be several
more days of arduous, stressful interrogation at a place distant
from his home and physicians.

(T-53, 58, 66). Plaintiff also

testified that in making his decision he had relied upon
information that he had obtained from the bankruptcy clerk's
office and upon information that he had obtained from counsel to
-7-

the effect that the entire case had been removed to the
bankruptcy court and that because removal papers had been filed,
proceedings, including his deposition in the state court were
stayed.

(T-65,70, 78-80)
The trial court granted defendants1 Motions for

Sanctions and awarded to the defendants costs and attorney's fees
incident to the deposition as well as those incurred in
connection with the motion in the amount of $10,300.00.

(T-113,

148-149)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant contends that there was sufficient evidence
presented to the court in April 1987 and at the sanctions hearing
to indicate that he was substantially justified in failing to
attend his deposition.

Plaintiff further argues that his conduct

under the circumstances did not warrant the extreme sanctions
imposed by the court thus amounting to an abuse of discretion.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the evidence presented at the
sanctions hearing did not justify the amount of attorney's fees
and costs awarded to defendant Bohemian and that the trial court
was mistaken in awarding certain of those expenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: PLAINTIFF'S NON-APPEARANCE AT HIS
DEPOSITION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED.
Defendants brought their Motion for Sanctions against
plaintiff pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(d).
-8-

Rule 3 7(d) reads:
If a party ... fails (1) to appear ... to take his
deposition, after served with a proper notice ... the
court in which the action is pending on motion may make
such orders ... as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B),
and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust. (emphasis added.)
(A copy of Rule 37 is attached hereto as Appendix n E n .)
In several Utah cases, this rule has been interpreted.

The

language of the rule as presently worded is permissive, rather
than mandatory, in that the court "may make such orders ... as
are just, ...H

Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976).

Furthermore the sanctions, and in particular attorney's fees and
costs are not called for when the failure to attend a deposition
is substantially justified.

Garrand v. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012,

1014 (Utah 1978) .
In the present case plaintiff submitted sufficient
evidence in April 1987 and at the sanctions hearing to indicate
that his health condition justified not attending the deposition.
The trial court had before it the letters from plaintiff's
physicians, Dr. Dick and Dr. Walsh, evidencing this condition in
April, 1987.

In his letter, Dr. Dick states:

I explained to Mr. Bender that should he delay he
-9-

could develop an intestinal rupture, a gangrenous
testicle, acute prostatitis requiring a surgical
procedure that could render him impotent, or some
degree of permanent nerve damage. I further explained
to Mr. Bender that it would be foolhardy to travel long
distances unnecessarily at this time or at any time in
the near future, until a final diagnosis had been made.
(A copy of Dr. Dick's letter is attached hereto as part of
Appendix wA".)
At the Motion for Sanctions hearing, plaintiff
indicated that as of the date of the deposition he was still
under a doctor's care and had been advised to keep in close
proximity and contact with his doctors.

(T-5 3)

When asked

whether his physical condition on the date of the deposition had
anything to do with him not appearing, plaintiff testified as
follows:
Yes, it did. I didn't want to go against my
doctor's wishes and be away from that area [California]
for very long. I felt that I could probably appear at
the hearing [bankruptcy] for a couple of hours. I was
assured that it would only be an hour hearing probably
at maximum and I could come up and back and it would
not be a problem... .
So I was concerned about my health but, as I said,
it was a very frightening experience for me. I am
generally very healthy and this was a very frightening
— I think its in a very sensitive area for any man and
I was very concerned about it, and especially when the
concern was that I may have nerve injury.
(T-58)
When asked why his health had anything to do with his
non-attendance at the deposition, plaintiff further responded:
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Because I -- I had spent seven days in deposition
already with the attorneys here today, and during that
time they were very harassing and accusatory, and it
was a very stressful climate to be in, which I was
advised not to be in.
And the last day of the deposition they seemed to
have a stack of documents about 15 inches high that
they indicated that they wanted to go through line by
line. And it appeared to me that they would be having
me in deposition for a matter of weeks and not for a
very short time at all.
And so I anticipated that this would be something
that would be a very long and arduous and stressful
time.
(T-66)
Plaintiff also explained at the hearing that in making
his decision to not attend he had relied upon information
obtained on the morning of the deposition from the bankruptcy
clerk's office and upon information that he had obtained from
counsel to the effect that the entire case had been removed to
the bankruptcy court and that because removal papers had been
filed, proceedings, including his deposition, in the state court
had been stayed.

(T-65, 70, and 78-80).

It is true that if a

copy of the application for removal together with notice thereof
had been filed with the trial court as of May 28, 198 7, all
proceedings in that court would have been stayed pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rules, Rule 9027(d) and the deposition.

(A copy of

this rule is attached hereto as Appendix "F").
Plaintiff stated that the reason he even attended the
bankruptcy meeting of creditors was that because he had been
-11-

At the time of the hearingf plaintiff had already
cooperated with defendants1 counsel by traveling to Salt Lake
City on three different occasions to sit for approximately eight
days of very stressful interrogation.

He testified at the

hearing that he was willing and able to go ahead with further
depositions at that time.

(T-66)

These facts taken together

with the justifications plaintiff submitted for not attending his
deposition do not demonstrate such callous and flagrant behavior
that would justify invoking a $10,300.00 sanction.

The Florida

court in Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S.2d 227 (Pla. 1973) stated
with respect to Rule 3 7 that:
The sanctions are set up as a means to an end, not
the end itself. The end is compliance. The sanctions
should be invoked only in flagrant cases, certainly in
no less than aggravated cases, and then only after the
court has given the defaulting party a reasonable
opportunity to conform after originally failing or even
refusing to appear. This is unmistakably the trend of
judicial thinking in Florida on the 'sanction1 Rule.
Accordingly, plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's decision or in the alternative reduce the amount of
expenses awarded.
POINT III:

THE TRIAL COURT WAS MISTAKEN IN

AWARDING DEFENDANT BOHEMIAN SAVINGS THE SUM OF $7,500.00.
After ruling that there was a basis for sanctions
against plaintiff, Judge Baldwin heard testimony from the various
defendants' counsel regarding the amount of time, hourly rates
and expenses they had incurred in connection with the deposition
-13-

and in obtaining the order for sanctions.

The testimony

concerning the expenses of Bohemian's counsel, Keith Taylor and
Kent Roche can be summarized as follows:
KEITH E. TAYLOR - Billing Rate $150/hr. (T-122)
May 28, 1987
Time conferring with counsel and in attending
deposition (T-121)
July 17, 1987
Telephone conference with Mike Westfall
re sanctions (T-121)

4.0 hr.

.5 hr.

July 20, 1987
Telephone conferences with Larry White, Mike
Westfall, Larry Moore, Sam Ebling, John Owen,
Judge Baldwin (T-121,122)

1.0 hr.

July 21, 1987
Telephone Conferences, intra-office conference,
finalizing Motion for Sanctions (T-122)

1.75 hr.

July 23, 1987
Conference with various counsel; letter to
Mr. Barker (T-122)

6.0 hr.

July 28, 1987
Attendance at hearing for sanctions and
scheduling conference (T-124)
T o t a l hours

10.0 hr.
23.25 hr.

23.25 hr x $150 = $ 3 , 4 8 7 . 5 0

Air Fare (Salt Lake to Parowan) (T-119)
Fees & Costs

180.00
$3,667.50

KENT 0. ROCHE - Billing rate $90/hr (T-122)
May 5, 1987
Drafting Notice of Deposition (T-122)
July 20, 1987
Telephone conference; revised Motion for
-14-

.5 hr.

Sanctions (T-122-123)

3.0 hr.

July 21, 1987
Telephone conference; Finalized Motion for
Sanctions (T-123)

4.0 hr.

July 22, 1987
Inter-office conference re hearing;
telephone conferences (T-123)

1.0 hr.
8.5 hrs.

8|.5 hr. x $90 =
TOTAL PEES & COSTS

765.00
$4,432.50

Despite the evidence presented, Judge Baldwin
arbitrarily awarded defendant Bohemian $7,50 0.0 0. (T-148)

Given

the time and expenses submitted by Bohemian's counsel, Mr. Taylor
and Mr. Roche, the trial court did not have sufficient
justification to award $7,500.00 unless the award was also based
upon the expenses of Samuel Ebling.

For the most part Mr.

Eblingfs expenses consisted of flying time and air fare from St.
Louis and accommodations at Little America Hotel.

(T-129-131)

Judge Baldwin, however, intimated that he was not going to award
two attorney's [Taylor's firm and Ebling's firm] fees for one
party when he said "I don't think —

then we have a problem of --

I am not a great believer in two attorney's fees for one party".
(T-114)

Therefore, plaintiff contends that the award of

$7,500.00 was done arbitrarily and in error and seeks a reductioj
in the trial judge's award to conform to the evidence presented.

-15-

POINT IV:

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY AWARDED

EXPENSES INCURRED FOR THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE.
The July 28, 198 7 hearing at Parowan was both a hearing
on the Motions for Sanctions and a scheduling conference.

At the

hearing Judge Baldwin stated:
All right. Before we get to the other matters, I
think there is basis for sanctions here against the
plaintiff for failure to appear at the last deposition
when he was in Salt Lake and his counsel was there and
he didn't appear. And I think the attorneys are
entitled to their fees for their appearance in Salt
Lake on that date and their appearance partly here
today because we've got a scheduling conference.
(emphasis added.)

(T-113)

Each of the counsel present at the hearing testified
that they had approximately ten hours time (mostly travel time to
and from Parowan) and $180 air fare in connection with the
hearing.

However, contrary to what he had indicated, Judge

Baldwin awarded these expenses without a reduction for the
scheduling conference.

Plaintiff contends that Judge Baldwin

erred by failing to reduce the time and expenses submitted, in
order to account for the fact that the parties were also there
for the scheduling conference.

Plaintiff therefore seeks from

this Court a reduction in the trial court's award of these
expenses.
CONCLUSION
The term "discretion" purports that the action should
be taken with reason and good conscience in the interests of
-16-

protecting the rights of both parties and serving the ends of
justice.

Carman, supra at 603.

Plaintiff submits that the trial

court abused its discretion in failing to find that he was
substantially justified in not attending his deposition and by
imposing such a severe sanction.
Plaintiff, therefore, requests that the judgments of
the trial court be reversed, or in the alternative, reduced.
DATED this

7 / 5 ^ day of January, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
SEAL & KENNEDY,
a Professional Corporation

By

^4^^^^^N
Alan ty. 4t'ewart
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

2-/sf

day of January,

1988, copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed
postage prepaid to:

Keith E. Taylor, Esq.
Kent 0. Roche, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant Bohemian Savings
& Loan Association
185 South State Street, Suite 7 00
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
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Samuel C. Ebling, Esq.
GALLOP, JOHNSON & NEUMAN
Attorneys for Defendant Bohemian Savings
& Loan Association
Interco Corporate Tower
101 South Hanley
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
Larry G. Moore, Esq.
Ira B. Rubinfeld, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant First Security Financial
Services
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Christopher L. Burton, Esq.
David R. Money, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant American Federal Savings
and Olympic Savings & Loan Association
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Michael R. Carlston, Esq.
R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
Jerry D. Fenn, Jr., Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Midwest Home Savings
& Loan Association and Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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COPY OF LETTERS FROM STAN M. WALSH, M.D., JOHN M.
DICK, M.D., and HOSPITAL INPATIENT RECORD

Appendix "A"

2SL™*"-

Re:

^

*

Corporate

Medical Group

Gary Bender

To Whom It May Concern:
Mr. Bender has been under the care of this office for several
serious medical conditions. His prognosis at present is
guarded.

Our advice to him has been bed rest and medication

until a firmer prognosis may be established.
Mr. Bender should not be traveling in automobiles or airplanes
until resolution of his medical problems.
Sincerely,

Stan M. Walch M.D.
SMWrskt

15603 Hawthorne H v i , liwitele, CI 30260 (213] 644-1144 Cible: Southed.

J O H N M. DICK, M.D. A N D ASSOCIATES, I N C .
MEDICAL

GROUP

! 1 1 6 0 WARNER AVENUE. SUITE 2 1 3
FOUNTAIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA

92708

(714) 340-1886

Mr. G. Michael Westfall, Esq.
Gallian & Westfall
Dixie State Bank Building
1 South Main Street
St. George, Utah 84770
April 15, 1987
Dear Mr. Westfall:
This is to inform you that Mr. Gary Bender was unable
to attend a legal proceeding in Utah due to an extended
illness that finally required his hospitalization. When
I informed him that it was necessary for him to enter the
hospital, he informed me that he had a previously scheduled appointment. I explained the importance of immediate
medical care and that I would explain the necessity of
his absence.
Mr. Bender was referred to me by his private doctor,
Dr. Stanley Welch, a staff physician at University of
California, Los Angeles. Dr. Welch is currently caring
for his own medical problems, and referred Mr. Bender to
me for care. After questioning Mr. Bender about his problems, and after examining him in my office, my working
diagnosis was that of rule/out subacute Meckel's Diverticulitis, R/0 torsion of the testicle, prostatitis, epidydimitis, R/0 herniated discs, R/0 stenosis of the spinal
canal with stricture of the cauda equina and/or the
nerve roots with radiating bilateral groin pain. A significant finding is that the pain reduces while the patient is supine, and steadily increases while sitting,
standing, or walking. I explained to Mr. Bender that
should he delay he could develop an intestinal rupture,
a gangrenous testicle, acute prostatitis requiring a surgical procedure that could render him impotent, or some
degree of permanent nerve damage. I further explained to
Mr. Bender that it would be foolhardy to travel long distances unnecessarily at this time or at any time in the
near futurej until a final diagnosis had been made.
Should he continue to disregard the seriousness of his
condition, his prognosis is poor. Should he undergo diagnosis and treatment, his prognosis would certainly be
better — hopefully good.
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Also, I have enclosed a n o t a r i z e d copy of the hospit a l admission record as requested. You w i l l note t h a t a l l
of the above diagnoses are not included of the face sheet
only because t h e r e was not enough room. The f u l l chart
w i l l r e f l e c t t h e s e diagnoses, but i t w i l l not be forwarded a t t h i s t ime, since i t i s not completed. When a l l the
s t u d i e s and_c o n s u l t a t i o n s are completed, a copy of the
c h a r t can be forwarded upon r e c e i p t of the p a t i e n t f s
authorization
During Mr. Bender's h o s p i t a l s t a y , he was seen by
Dr. Melvin Novegrad, a board c e r t i f i e d u r o l o g i s t , and the
d i a g n o s i s of acute p r o s t a t i t i s was confirmed. He also
s t a t e d t h a t a l l of t h e pain could not be accounted for by
t h i s d i a g n o s i s . With h i s concurrence, Drs. Cleemanns and
Cummings, board c e r t i f i e d n e u r o l o g i s t s , were asked to
consult t o determine p o s s i b l e neifological causes of the
p a i n . G a s t r o i n t e s t i n a l s t u d i e s were conducted by me and
t h e s e were found t o be n e g a t i v e .
I am a physician l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e medicine in
t h e s t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , and a member of the Academy of
Family P r a c t i c e , c u r r e n t l y board c e r t i f i e d .
I am also a
member of the College of Emergency P h y s i c i a n s . If I can
be of f u r t h e r a s s i s t a n c e , please contact me at the above
address.
t r u l y yo^jsslA

W\J
ohn M. D i c k , M.D.
. A. F . P .

efore me,
/L0/.<:^0j4jp.jtQ&

County of

-?~r

the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared

™
5,^__U5^
Vr3*&4*&
j \"&%£$$J

V^FICIAL SEAL
I
LOIS BARRETT
k
Notary Public-Cai-fcTO! t
ORANGE COUNTY
j(

^^tfersonally known to me
• proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence
to be the person(s) whose name(s)
^^r?^s
/) subscribed to the
within instrument, and acknowledged that c—*KPy
executed it
WITNESS-my hand and official se

My Comm Exo Oct 27 1989
Notary s Signature
ERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT FORM

7110 052

NATIONAL NOTARY ASSOCIATION • 23012 Ventura Blvd • Woodland Hills (

INPATIENT REGISTRATION FORM
jSl
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19£., before me
the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared

OFFICIAL SEAL
&
LOSS BARRETT
Notary Pubiic-Calitornia
ORANGE COUNTY
My Comm. Exp. Oct. 27 1989 \

D personally known to me
• proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence
to be the person(s) whose name(s)
—^<2^
^/subscribed to th<
within instrument, and acknowledged that m^iZ^Cy
executed it
WITNESS my hand and otticial-se£l.

y^/o

Notary's Signature
•RAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT FORM

7110 052

tUfMs$

NATIONAL NOTARY ASSOCIATION • 23012 Ventura Blvd. • Wooaland Hills. (

JWJJ^<\
MEDICAL RECORDS FINALBfAGNOSIS

WA^^^J

Attending Physician

rOUHLcllil V cllicy u c g i u i i a i n u o ^ i u u i
and Medical Center

Rose Barron, A.R.T,
(Custodian of Medical Records)
says as follows:
ta) That affiant is the duly authorized custodian
of the medical records of Fountain Valley Regional Hospital,
and has authority to certify said records, and

(b) That the copy of medical records attached to
this affidavid is a true copy of all the records described
in the subpoena duces tecum, and
(c) That the records were prepared by the personnel of
the hospital, staff physicians, or persons acting under the
control of either, in the ordinary course of hospital business
at or near the time of the act, condition or event.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.

. 4-/b-

DATE:

27

i^2^M^r>i Q~\Jh\J<
Signature of custodian

rb
rev. 3/86

17100 Euclid At Warner • P.O. Box 8010 • Fountain Valley, California 92708 • (714) 979-1211

COPY OF MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND/OR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Appendix "B"

FIFTH JUDICIAL UIS i COURI
IRON COUNTY

W3f
MAR 2 3 1987

GALLIAN 6 WESTFALL
Russell J. Gallian
G. Michael Westfall
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. BOX 1339
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; and GARY
BENDER and BONNIE M. BENDER,
husband and wife,

)
)

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
OF DEPOSITION AND/OR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation; )
et. al.

CIVIL No. C86-2057

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Gary Bender, by and through his attorney, G. Michael
Westfall of the law firm of Gallian & Westfall, hereby moves for an
Order granting a continuance of the deposition of Mr. Bender and/or
for a Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, directing that the deposition currently scheduled
for Gary Bender on the 31st day of March, 1987, be continued.

The

grounds for this Motion are that Mr. Bender is currently under a
doctor's

care

for what

is

perceived

potentially serious medical problem.
M20/15

by

his

doctor

to

be a

Mr. Bender has been advised by

his physician that, because of the perceived nature of Mr. Benderfs
medical problems, the need to monitor Mr. Bender's condition and his
reaction to treatment, and the need for further tests in order to
accurately assess the nature and extent of his medical condition,
Mr. Bender should not travel for any length of time and should not
leave the care of his physician for more than one or two days at a
time.
The deposition of Mr. Bender should be continued until such
time as his physician has been able to determine the nature and
extent of the medical problem and it is either cured or arrangements
made to control it so that Mr. Bender can appear to have the balance
of his deposition taken.
A statement of Mr. Bender's doctor, Dr. Stan Walsh, concerning
Mr. Bender's medical condition will be filed to supplement

this

Motion upon receipt of same.
DATED this U ' ~ day of March, 1987.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL

/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed, postage prepaid, this JO
day of -February-/^
1987, to:
Keith E. Taylor, Esq.
Kent Roche, Esq.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Bohemian Savings & Loan
Association and Richard
Guidinas

David L. Kabat, Esq.
Morrissey and Kay
Oakbrook Executive Plaza, #807
1301 W. 22nd
Oak Brook, IL
60521
Attorneys for American Federal
Savings & Loan Association,
John J. Lanigan and Jack Trafton
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Southwestern
^
soutn western
£ &
Corporation
*
Medical Group

Stan M. Walch, M.D.
l*"""*

March 13, 1987

Re:

Gary Bender

To Whom It May Concern:
Mr. Bender has been under the care of this office for several
serious medical conditions.
guarded.

His prognosis at present is

Our advice to him has been bed rest and medication

until a firmer prognosis may be established.
Mr. Bender should not be traveling in automobiles or airplanes
until resolution of his medical problems.
Sincerely,

Stan M. Walch M.D.
SMW:skt

15603 Hawthorne Blvd., Lawndale, CA 90260 (213) 644-1144 Cable: SouthMed.

COPY OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Appendix "C"

KEITH E. TAYLOR (A3201)
KENT 0. ROCHE (A2783)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

i? ^ s s ^ p w r
^

***£

SAMUEL C. EBLING
DAVID W. HARLAN
of and for
GALLOP, JOHNSON & NEUMAN
Interco Corporate Tower
101 South Hanley
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
Telephone: (314) 862-1200
Attorneys for Defendant
Bohemian Savings and Loan Association
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; and
GARY BENDER AND BONNIE M.
BENDER, Husband and Wife,

DEFENDANT BOHEMIAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 86-257
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation; OLYMPIC SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Illinois
corporation, successor in
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Illinois
corporation; LINCOLN SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Florida
corporation; MIDWEST HOME
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, an
Illinois corporation; FIRST
SECURITY REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
PREMIER FINANCIAL GROUP, a
California company; STEVEN
H. WEISER; STEVEN H. WEISER
CORPORATION, a California

Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.

corporation, d/b/a/ PREMIER
FINANCIAL GROUP; VINCENT
BOMMARITO, an individual; JOHN
CAPOZZI, an individual; RICHARD
GUDINAS, an individual; DAN R.
WOOD, an individual; and JACK
TRAFTON, an individual,
Defendants.
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation,

)
)
)

Counterclaimant,

)

vs.

)

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORA)
TION, a Utah corporation;
)
GARY BENDER; BONNIE M. BENDER; )
ROBERT F. GOLDHIRSCH and
)
CHRISTOPHER J. DWYER, doing
)
business as BRIAN HEAD SNOW
)
REMOVAL; ANDREW KALAFUT;
)
SINGLETON METAL FABRICATION,
)
INC.; GILBERT DEVELOPMENT
)
CORPORATION; CEDAR ROCK &
)
SAND, INC.; WESTERN ROCK
)
PRODUCTS CORPORATION; SHEPLER
)
ASSOCIATES, INC.; GEORG'S SKI
)
SHOP, INC.; ANDERSON LUMBER
)
COMPANY; SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS
)
COMPANY; DAVID C. TOWBIN &
)
ASSOCIATES, INC.; and
)
•INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, )
Counterclaim
Defendants.

)
)
* * * * * * *

Pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Bohemian Savings and Loan Association ("Bohemian") hereby moves the Court for an order imposing appropriate
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I""11 i e q Lo u 11 d s

s a n c t J o n s a q a i ni s t p 1 a i ri t i f f s ,

1 o i" t I 'i i s m o t i o n

as

well as the sanctions being requested, ax e as follows:
1.

On March

27, 1987, this Court

entered

aiI order

denying p l a i n t i f f s ' Motion for Continuance of Deposition and/or
Protective Order and allowing Bohemian to proceed with the d e p o sition

" | , i IF hi i i li h a d p r ev

.

;

been duly noticed
t lie nf I i c, es

commence at 9:00

*.

r

March 31, 1987

I P--

ie from day

to day until completed.
2.

Bender appeared

and place and was interrogated

\QL

ii±s

at that

time

^r counsel lot Bohemian and cer-

tain of the other defendants from 9:00
t h r o u g h 3 i 5 5 fi! m

deposition

a.m.

on March 31, 1 98 7

o i i Ap i: - i ] 3 , 1 9 8 7, a t w h 11: hi I i. in e t; I'i e ciepos i 11 o i i

was adjourned at Bender's request so that he could make his previ ous] y schedu] <•
Before

•• -

adjourning

questday, Apri.

f 1 i gh

trie deposition
leposi

, ->,„

seek any desired

)range Count y , Ca 1 i fornia.
Bender

and

his

counsel

re-

resume until 9:00 a.m. on T u e s r. *- Sender would have an opportunity to

medical

attention

on Monday,

April

6,

1387.

Defendants granted I. lii.il request ,
Neither Bender nor his counsel
i" esunip 11 o

appeared

for

the

1, 11 e 6epos i t i on a 1: 9: 0 0 a in: i. on: i Ti lesday, Apr i 1 7 f

1987, as previously agreed upon

Counsel for Bohemian were noti-

fied by Bender's counsel at approximately 5:00 p.m. or i April 6,
1987 that Bender may or may i lot be entering a hospital

in Ca] i-

fornia and may or may not appear as previously agreed upon for
-3-

the resumption of his deposition.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on

April 6, Bender's counsel notified Bohemian's counsel that Bender
would not

appear for the resumption

agreed upon time and place.

of his deposition

at the

When contacted by Bohemian's counsel

on the morning of April 7, 1987, Bender's counsel stated that he
had been advised by Bender's wife that Bender had been hospitalized in California, but that he had not had an opportunity to
verify the hospitalization or to speak to Bender himself or to
ascertain

the

nature

of

Bender's

supposed

medical

problem.

Bender's counsel advised that Stan M. Walch, M.D.f was

Bender's

admitting physician.
4.

Based upon the above-stated grounds, Bohemian re-

spectfully requests that the Court exercise its discretion under
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and impose the
following sanctions:
(a)

Staying plaintiffs from proceeding with any

further discovery or from taking any action whatsoever

in this

matter until such time as the Bender deposition has been completed;
(b)

Dismissing plaintiffs' alleged causes of ac-

tion with prejudice unless Bender appears at Salt Lake City and
completes

the taking of his deposition not

later than May 8,

1987; and
(c)

Awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Bohe-

mian for appearing at the time and place set for the resumption

-4-

of the Bendei

-Jepos \ > 'i'<j<'< JMJ t « the filing and processing of

this motion.
5.

Counsel for Bender and all of the defendants par-

ticipating in the deposition have agreed that this mot nm IUHIV i\v
heard by the Court at 3:00 p.m. on April 7, 1387 at the District
Court in Salt Lake City, Utah.
DATED this /jjA

day of April. Jr9?7.

KEI'ttUB.' TAYLORS
KENT 0. ROCHE
of and for
PARSONS1 BEHLE &.LATTH

SAMUEL C. EBLING"'
DAVID W. HARLAN
of and for
GALLOP, JOHNSON & NEUMAN
Attorneys for Bohemian Savings and
Loan Association
214-040787A
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COPY OF ORDER REGARDING MOTJON FOR SANCTIONS

Appendix "D"

KEITH E. TAYLOR (A3201)
KENT 0. ROCHE (A2783)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

FIFTHjUOtCIAL OISI COUR.
IRON COUNTY

P I L E D
APR I S 1987

(Uit^ j

W/^or

SAMUEL C. EBLING
DAVID W. HARLAN
of and for
GALLOP, JOHNSON & NEUMAN
Interco Corporate Tower
101 South Hanley
St. Louis, Missouri 63105
Telephone: (314) 862-1200
Attorneys for Defendant
Bohemian Savings and Loan Association
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; and
GARY BENDER AND BONNIE M.
BENDER, Husband and Wife,

ORDER REGARDING MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
C l v i 1 N o , B b J'.) /

BOHEMIAN SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation; OLYMPIC SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Illinois
corporation, successor in
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Illinois
corporation; LINCOLN SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Florida
corporation; MIDWEST HOME
SAVINGS S. LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
Illinois corporation; FIRST
SECURITY REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
PREMIER FINANCIAL GROUP, a
California company; STEVEN
H. WEISER; STEVEN H. WEISER
CORPORATION, a California

Judge Ernest F. Baldw

DEPUT'

corporation, d/b/a/ PREMIER
FINANCIAL GROUP; VINCENT
BOMMARITO, an individual; JOHN
CAPOZZI, an individual; RICHARD
GUDINAS, an individual; DAN R.
WOOD, an individual; and JACK
TRAFTON, an individual,
Defendants.
BOHEMIAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation,

)
)
)

Counterclaimant,

)

vs.

)

PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
GARY BENDER; BONNIE M. BENDER;
ROBERT F. GOLDHIRSCH and
CHRISTOPHER J. DWYER, doing
business as BRIAN HEAD SNOW
REMOVAL; ANDREW KALAFUT;
SINGLETON METAL FABRICATION,
INC.; GILBERT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; CEDAR ROCK &
SAND, INC.; WESTERN ROCK
PRODUCTS CORPORATION; SHEPLER
ASSOCIATES, INC.; GEORG'S SKI
SHOP, INC.; ANDERSON LUMBER
COMPANY; SCHOLZEN PRODUCTS
COMPANY; DAVID C. TOWBIN &
ASSOCIATES, INC.; and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Counterclaim
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

* * * * * * *

Defendant

Bohemian

Savings

and

Loan

Association's

("Bohemian") Motion for Sanctions came on for hearing before the
Court sitting at Salt Lake City at 3:00 p.m. on April 7, 1987.
Bohemian was represented by Samuel C. Ebling, Keith E. Taylor,
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and

I1" 1 a i int i f f S w e n 1 r e p r e s e n t e d

0 , \Uv lie

Bent

Westfall,
defendants

h'| 1,1

Mirhael

Also appearing were Christopher L, Burton, counsel for
American, Federa ] Savings

and

Loan

Olympic Savings and Loan Association, Jerry

n

Association

and

Fennr counsel for

defendants Midwest Home Savings and Loan Association and Lincoln
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
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If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney
fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
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(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment substituted "shall" for "may" near the
beginning of the first and second paragraph of
Subdivision (a)(4), inserted "or if a party fails
to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f)" in
the intioductorv language of Subdivision
fb)(2), substituted piesent Subdivision (e) for
former Subdivisions (e) and (f), relating to sub-

poena of person in foreign country, and expenses against United States, respectively, and
made a series of minoi word changes thioughout Subdivisions (a) and (b).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule .37, F R.C P
Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
—Privilege against self-incrimination.
Attorney fees.
Expenses on failure to admit.
—Failure to respond to requests.
Failure to comply with order
—Arrest of party
Failure to appear at deposition.
—Arrest of witness
Failure to produce documents.
—Discretionary sanctions
—Dismissal without prejudice.
—Judgment.
Failure to produce documents.
—Striking of answer.
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Advisory Committee Note
Motions to reopen cases are governed by Rule 5010. Reconsideration of
orders allowing and disallowing claims is governed by Rule 3008. For the
purpose of this rule all orders of the bankruptcy court are subject to Rule 60
F.R.Civ.P.
Pursuant to § 727(e) of the Code a complaint to revoke a discharge must
be filed within one year of the entry of the discharge or, when certain
grounds of revocation are asserted, the later of one year after the entry of
the discharge or the date the case is closed. Under § 1144 and § 1330 of the
Code a party must file a complaint to revoke an order confirming a chapter
11 or 13 plan within 180 days of its entry. Clauses (2) and (3) of this rule
make it clear that the time periods established by §§ 727(e), 1144 and 1330
of the Code may not be circumvented by the invocation of F.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
Rule 9025
SECURITY: PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SURETIES
Whenever the Code or these rules require or permit the giving of security by
a party, and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other
undertaking with one or more sureties, each surety submits to the jurisdiction of
the court, and liability may be determined in an adversary proceeding governed
by the rules in Part VII.
Advisory Committee Note
This rule is an adaptation of Rule 65.1 F.R.Civ.P. and applies to any
surety on a bond given pursuant to § 303(e) of the Code, Rules 2001, 2010,
5008, 7062, 7065, 8005, or any other rule authorizing the giving of such
security.
Rule 9026
EXCEPTIONS UNNECESSARY
Rule 46 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the Code.
Rule 9027
REMOVAL
(a) Application.
(1) Where Filed; Form and Content An application for removal shall be
filed in the bankruptcy court for the district and division within which is located
the state or federal court where the civil action is pending. The application
shall be verified and contain a short and plain statement of the facts which
entitle the applicant to remove and be accompanied by a copy of all process and
pleadings.
(2) Time for Filing; Civil Action Initiated Before Commencement of the Case
Under the Code. If the claim or cause of action in a civil action is pending when
a case under the Code is commenced, an application for removal may be filed in
the bankruptcy court only within the longest of (A) 90 days after the order for
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relief in the case under the Code, (B) 30 days after entry or an oraer WIIUUMUUS
a stay, if the claim or cause of action in a civil action has been stayed under
§ 362 of the Code, or (C) 30 days after a trustee qualifies in a chapter 11
reorganization case but not later than 180 days after the order for relief.
(3) Time for Filng; Civil Action Initiated After Commencement of the Case
Under the Code. If a case under the Code is pending when a claim or cause of
action is asserted in a court other than a bankruptcy court, an application for
removal may be filed in the bankruptcy court only within the shorter of (A) 30
days after receipt, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading
setting forth the claim or cause of action sought to be removed or (B) 30 days
after receipt of the summons if the initial pleading has been filed with the court
but not served with the summons.
(b) Bond, An application for removal, except when the applicant is the
trustee, debtor, debtor in possession, or the United States shall be accompanied
by a bond with good and sufficient surety conditioned that the party will pay all
costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the removal should it be determined that the claim or cause of action was not removable or was improperly
removed.
(c) Notice. Promptly after filing the application and the bond, if required,
in the bankruptcy court, the applicant shall serve a copy of the application on all
parties to the removed claim or cause of action.
(d) Filing in Non-bankruptcy Court. Removal of the claim or cause of
action is effected on the filing of a copy of the removal application with the clerk
of the court from which the claim or cause of action is removed. The parties
shall proceed no further in that court unless and until the claim or cause of
action is remanded.
(e) Remand. A motion for remand of the removed claim or cause of action
may be filed only in the bankruptcy court and shall be served on the parties to
the removed claim or cause of action. A motion to remand shall be determined
as soon as practicable. A certified copy of an order of remand shall be mailed to
the clerk of the court from which the claim or cause of action was removed.
(f) Procedure After Removal.
(1) After removal of a claim or cause of action to a bankruptcy court the
bankruptcy court may issue all necessary orders and process to bring before it all
proper parties whether served by process issued by the court from which the
claim or cause of action was removed or otherwise.
(2) The bankruptcy court may require the applicant to file with the clerk
copies of all records and proceedings relating to the claim or cause of action in
the court from which the claim or cause of action was removed.
(g) Process After Removal. If one or more of the defendants has not been
served with process, the service has not been perfected prior to removed, or the
process served proves to be defective, such process or service may be completed
or new process issued in the same manner as in adversary proceedings originally
filed in the bankruptcy court. This subdivision shall not deprive any defendant
on whom process is served after removal of his right to move to remand the case.
(h) Applicability of Part VII. The rules of Part VII apply to a claim or
cause of action removed to a bankruptcy court from a federal or state court and
govern procedure after removal. Repleading is not necessary unless the court so
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orders. In a removed action in which the defendant has not answered, he shall
answer or present the other defenses or objections available to him under the
rules of Part VII within 20 days following the receipt through service or
otherwise of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief on
which the action or proceeding is based, or within 20 days following the service
of summons on such initial pleading, or within five days following the filing of
the application for removal, whichever period is longest.
(i) Time for Filing a Demand for Jury Trial. If at the time of removal
all necessary pleadings have been served, a party entitled to trial by jury shall
be accorded it, if his demand therefor is served within 10 days following the
filing of the application for removal if he is the applicant, or if he is not the
applicant, within 10 days following service on him of notice of the filing of the
application. A party who, prior to removal, has made an express demand for
trial by jury in accordance with federal or state law, need not renew the demand
after removal. If state law applicable in the court from which the claim or cause
of action is removed does not require the parties to make an express demand for
trial by jury, they need not make a demand after removal unless the bankruptcy
court so directs. The bankruptcy court may so direct on its own initiative and
shall so direct at the request of any party to the removed claim or cause of
action. The failure of a party to make demand as directed constitutes a waiver
by him of trial by jury.
(j) Record Supplied. When a party is entitled to copies of the records and
proceedings in any civil action or proceeding in a federal or a state court, to be
used in a bankruptcy court, and the clerk of the federal or state court, on
demand accompanied by payment or tender of the lawful fees, fails to deliver
certified copies, the bankruptcy court may, on affidavit reciting the facts, direct
such record to be supplied by affidavit or otherwise. Thereupon the proceedings,
trial and judgment may be had in the bankruptcy court, and ail process awarded,
as if certified copies had been filed in the bankruptcy court.
(k) Attachment or Sequestration; Securities. When a claim or cause of
action is removed to a bankruptcy court, any attachment or sequestration of
property in the court from which the claim or cause of action was removed shall
hold the property to answer the final judgment or decree in the same manner as
the property would have been held to answer final judgment or decree had it
been rendered by the court from which the claim or cause of action was removed.
All bonds, undertakings, or security given by either party to the claim or cause
of action prior to its removal shall remain valid and effectual notwithstanding
such removal. All injunctions issued, orders entered and other proceedings had
prior to removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified
by the bankruptcy court.
Advisory Committee Note
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1478(a) "any claim or cause of action in a civil action,
other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil action
by a Government unit to enforce [a] . . . regulatory or police power" may
be removed "if the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over such claim or
cause of action." This rule specifies how removal is accomplished, the
procedure thereafter, and the procedure to request remand of the removed
claim or cause of action. If the claim or cause of action which is removed to
the bankruptcy court is subject to the automatic stay of § 362 of the Code,
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